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The purpose of this paper is to assess the non-violent instruments of statecraft that will likely be of greater and lesser value to the United States over the next ten years.
Rather than trying to make sweeping generalizations that could apply to all of the United States's foreign relations, this paper will examine the value of non-violent instruments of statecraft to one critical concern: United States relations with China. The rationale for this "case study" approach is that the value of each of the non-violent instruments of statecraft can vary greatly depending on the context. Instruments that are appropriate for relations between the United States and a friendly, democratic, industrialized marketeconomy country may not be as appropriate for relations with a non-aligned, authoritarian, developing country.
Objectives. The value of the instruments of statecraft depends on the strategic objective(s). The value of the means can only be determined in consideration of the desired ends. Before considering the value of the various instruments of statecraft, the objective must be stated. According to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the objective of United States policy toward China is to "encourage the emergence of a China that is stable and non-aggressive; that tolerates differing views and adheres to international rules of conduct; and that cooperates with us to build a secure regional and international order." 1 Inferred in the phrase "tolerates differing views" is a reference to the question of human rights in China and the phrase "adheres to international rules of conduct" speaks to an objective of strengthening China's integration into non-proliferation regimes.
The most fundamental United States objective is to encourage the emergence of a stable, non-aggressive China. To achieve this objective, United States policy has focused on promoting further liberalization of the Chinese economy to a market economy. As this paper will argue, the United States's greatest opportunity is to pursue economic relations with China that simultaneously foster greater political pluralism and responsible international behavior.
China is concurrently viewed as a partner and a threat, depending on the context. During the summit, President Clinton spoke out more openly and forcefully about human rights in China than any foreign leader has ever done in that country. And he did so not in one isolated instance, but in a series of very public appearances. The President's trip exposed hundreds of millions of Chinese to America's conviction that human rights are universal --and that human freedom is indispensable to any country's effort to compete in the world economy…. Once people see the power of the mass media to improve their lives by providing information and exposing wrongdoing, it becomes very hard to close their eyes again. And once people understand that another, freer way of life really is possible --that it exists elsewhere and that it works --it becomes very hard to deny it to them forever.
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A successful public diplomacy campaign cannot consist solely of an occasional Presidential trip. For this instrument to be valuable, it must consist of a broad-based, ongoing program of exchanges, scholarships, information, and cultural activities that targets the successor generation 7 . In addition to these "face-to-face" methods, the United
States should also conduct "mass media" public diplomacy by employing the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and the Internet. Alliances. The instrument of bilateral alliances will be one of the least valuable tools for the United States to obtain its strategic objectives for China within the next ten
years. An alliance is a "formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states. The defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specified set of circumstances." Square decisively ended any lingering ideas about strategic partnership with China.
13
While both countries share some economic, security, and political goals, there is no mutually perceived threat to justify establishing a bilateral alliance.
Alliances with other Asian countries contribute to United States objectives for a non-aggressive China. For example, the US-Japan security alliance eliminates any need for China to feel threatened by Japan. So long as the United States maintains its military presence in Japan, Beijing will have no fears about a revival of Japanese militarism or that Tokyo would acquire nuclear weapons.
14 Coercive Instruments. Sanctions. The use of economic sanctions --the denial of customary export, import or financial relations with a target country in an effort to change the country's laws or policies --will not be a valuable tool for dealing with China.
Encouraging the transition of the Chinese economy to a market economy that is integrated into the global economy is the foundation of American strategy to create a stable, non-aggressive China. The United States has pursued a policy of "positive sanctions" with regard to China. Washington sought to encourage Chinese behavior with rewards and positive reinforcement rather than with threats. The White Houses's rationale for this approach is that a market-oriented, global economy strengthens the hand of reform advocates within China, which will be the engine or catalyst for change.
Positive economic incentives, including normal trade relations, "helps us to move China 13 Bates Gill, "Limited Engagement," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 1999) 
